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Recently  the Dutch financial reporting standard setters  have  taken steps to 
make dirty surplus accounting flows more visible to parties outside firms, either by 
eliminating their possibility or by requiring comprehensive income type statements. 
These steps are presumably based on the idea that dirty surplus accounting flows are 
value relevant to investors and hence have to be visible to them. Whether dirty surplus 
accounting flows are indeed value relevant is an empirical issue. This paper therefore 
explores  both  incremental  and  relative  value  relevance  of  various  dirty  surplus 
accounting flows for Dutch listed firms.  
We  find  evidence  that  dirty  surplus  goodwill  write-offs  in  particular  are 
relevant in explaining returns and that the clean surplus earnings perform better than 
the  reported  earnings  over  1-year  intervals.  Taken  together,  these  1-year  interval 
empirical  results  indeed  imply  that  the  Dutch  managers  in  the  period  considered 
wrote-off value relevant information via dirty surplus accounting flows. Over longer-
term intervals, dirty surplus items are not or negatively related to returns and reported 
income becomes more value relevant than clean surplus income.   
 
Keywords: Dirty surplus accounting flows; Value relevance; The Netherlands.  
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1. Introduction  
Value  relevance  of  accounting  information,  most  notably  earnings,  is  an 
important topic because of the widespread use of accounting measures for contracting 
and valuation purposes (Watts and Zimmerman 1986, and Beaver 1998). Recently, 
standard setting bodies for financial reporting have come under attack for allowing 
potentially value relevant dirty surplus items to be kept out of earnings. In this paper, 
we will empirically test their relevance for security returns. 
Two views exist about ‘dirty surplus accounting flows’. Excluding irrelevant 
dirty  surplus  flows  from  earnings  could  improve  earnings  quality  and  could  be  a 
method  of  communicating  insider  information.  By  taking  these  potentially  noisy 
earnings  components  (i.e.  irrelevant  dirty  surplus  accounting  flows)  directly  to 
shareholder’s equity, firm managers can claim they are showing the market that those 
flows  are  not  useful  for  earnings-based  firm  valuation.  On  the  other  hand,  value 
relevant dirty surplus flows could be evidence of earnings management. Managers 
could hide value relevant information by excluding these flows from earnings.  
In fact, in more and more countries standard setters, apparently accepting the 
second view, are eliminating dirty surplus accounting options to reduce managers’ 
discretion on reported bottom-line earnings and hence to improve earnings quality. 
For example, in the UK, the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) effectively abolished 
extraordinary items in 1992 (FRS 3) and eliminated the dirty surplus treatment of 
goodwill write-offs in 1998 (FRS 10). In the Netherlands, the Council for Annual 
Reporting abolished dirty surplus treatment of goodwill in 2000 (RJ 500.218), and in 
February 2001 the Dutch government has proposed legislature to Parliament to the 
same effect (Kamerstukken Eerste en Tweede Kamer, publication number 28220).  
Recent theoretical accounting research by Feltham and Ohlson (1995), and 
Ohlson (1995) may provide another reason for the attention directed towards clean  
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surplus accounting. In their residual income-based valuation framework, accounting 
numbers are directly linked to firm value. But this happens under the condition of 
clean  surplus  accounting.  The  clean  surplus  relation  is  one  of  the  fundamental 
assumptions  to  express  firm  value  in  terms  of  observable  accounting  variables 
(Bernard 1995, Walker 1997, Dechow et al. 1999, and Courteau et al. 2001). 
But how relevant are dirty surplus items for firm value? And also, given the 
cost of new regulation and the cost of enforcement, do they deserve the recent special 
attention of standard setting bodies? In this paper, we empirically examine the value 
relevance of dirty surplus accounting flows.  
This study looks at Dutch listed firms in the period of 1988 to 1997. During 
that period a large number of dirty surplus accounting flows were allowed in the 
Netherlands.  This  makes  the  Netherlands  an  interesting  setting  to  investigate  the 
relevance of dirty surplus items.  
In addition, in the Netherlands investors are thought to be less influential in 
company’s  decision-making  process  due  to  the  Dutch  policy  of  self-regulation  in 
private sector for financial reporting (DeJong et al. 2002). Also investors have little 
direct influence on the composition of the supervisory board in its co-optation system
1 
because  new  board  members  are  ‘self-elected’  by  the  remaining  members  in  that 
board.  The freedom in choosing financial  reporting methods that Dutch managers 
enjoy, and the  characteristics  of the governance  structure, therefore could provide 
room for managers’ opportunistic reporting behavior.  
It is interesting to find out whether Dutch managers indeed take advantage of 
this freedom by excluding value relevant dirty surplus items from earnings or if they 
use accounting flexibility to improve reporting quality by doing this.  
                                                           
1 Firms are run by a management board and this management board is appointed by the self-elected 
supervisory board.   
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In order to test the value relevance of various dirty surplus flows empirically, 
we use the standard approach of examining the statistical association between dirty 
surplus flows and stock returns. We employ an incremental value relevance method 
similar to that used by O’Hanlon and Pope (1999). In addition, we also conduct a 
relative value relevance study to compare the explanatory power (i.e. with respect to 
returns) of clean surplus earnings and reported earnings (under the Dutch GAAP).  
We find that in the Netherlands, dirty surplus flows; in particular, currency 
translation  differences  and  goodwill  write-offs  are  value  relevant  over  a  1-year 
interval. Clean surplus earnings are more value relevant than reported earnings over a 
1-year  interval.  However,  over  longer  windows  (i.e.  2,  5,  and  10-year  windows) 
reported earnings are the preferred explanatory variable for returns and dirty surplus 
items are not or negatively related to returns. Hence, over one year intervals Dutch 
managers  do  appear  to  exclude  value  relevant  items  from  income  in  the  period 
considered.     
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
discuss dirty surplus accounting and provide some empirical evidence on the value 
relevance of dirty surplus flows. The third section discusses dirty surplus accounting 
practices in the Netherlands. The fourth section describes the hypothesis development 
and the research design. The data analysis and the empirical results are presented in 
the fifth section. In the final section, we conclude the paper and provide suggestions 
for future research.    
  
2. Literature review 
2.1. Dirty surplus accounting 
Dirty  surplus  flows arise  if  certain  changes  in shareholders’  equity  bypass 
reported earnings. Financial statements are stated on a clean surplus basis if ending- 
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period book value ( t BV ) equals the sum of opening-period book value ( 1 - t BV ), clean 
surplus  earnings  ( t NICL )  excluding  dividends  ( t DIV ),  and  the  net  capital  inflow 
( t NetCap ): t t t t t DIV NetCap NICL BV BV - + + = -1 .  
Perceived  problems  with  dirty  surplus  accounting  practices  stem  from  a 
concern that they might lead to a lack of transparency and to managers’ opportunistic 
behaviors since those flows may be more subject to manipulation (Brief and Peasnell 
1996, and O’Hanlon and Pope 1999). Therefore, investors may not be able to identify 
value relevant items.  
However, financial market is efficient on average and investors are expected 
to  be  able  to  undo  management’s  manipulation  and  see  ‘through’  earnings.  The 
efficient  market  therefore  provides  us  with  an  opportunity  to  detect  opportunistic 
reporting behavior. Dirty surplus accounting flows, or earnings, are thought to be 
manipulated  if  these  flows  are  incrementally  (in  addition  to  reported  earnings) 
relevant. The reported earnings, which are higher than the pro forma clean surplus 
earnings, could be used for other contracting purposes (see Biddle and Choi 2002, for 
empirical  evidence  on  the  relevance  of  dirty  surplus  flows  for  compensation 
purposes).      
Given the importance of earnings for firm valuation, it is therefore relevant to 
empirically investigate the valuation effects of dirty surplus flows on earnings. Unless 
dirty surplus flows can convey consistent information to the market, they would be 
considered  as  ‘noise’  in  investors’  decision-making  process.  The  inclusion  of 
transitory dirty surplus items to earnings would then lead to a reduction of earnings 
quality (Watts and Zimmerman 1986, Beaver 1998, and Scott 2003). That is to say, 
even if those flows are incrementally (in addition to reported earnings) relevant, the  
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clean surplus earnings may not be more relevant than reported earnings to explain 
returns. 
 
2.2. Evidence on the magnitude and the value relevance of dirty surplus 
accounting flows 
There  are  some  descriptive  statistics  on  the  importance  of  dirty  surplus 
accounting flows. Median market value deflated dirty surplus flows are -0.004 in the 
UK (O’Hanlon and Pope 1999) and 0.000 in the US (Dhaliwal et al. 1999) in the 
period they studied. The empirical data in Lo and Lys (2000) shows a considerable 
deviation  of  clean  surplus  accounting  for  US  firms
2.  In  particular,  if  ‘income’  is 
defined as GAAP net income, 14.41 percent of observations have deviations of more 
than  10  percent  of  comprehensive  (i.e.  clean  surplus)  income.  This  stresses  the 
potential  importance  of  the  dirty  surplus  components  of  reported  accounting 
information. Similar information can be found in Hand and Landsman (1998), and 
Courteau et al. (2001), both also with US data. 
Despite this, the evidence on the value relevance of dirty surplus flows in the 
US  suggests  that  ' comprehensive  income'   (CI)  (i.e.  clean  surplus  income)  (FASB 
1997)  does  not  perform  better  than  net income  when  associating  both with  stock 
returns (Dhaliwal et al. 1999, and Biddle and Choi 2002). In the UK, O' Hanlon and 
Pope  (1999)  also  find  hardly  any  evidence  that  dirty  surplus  flows  explain  stock 
returns. Together, these studies indicate that dirty surplus flows may not be value 
relevant.   
 
3. Dirty surplus accounting practices in the Netherlands 
3.1. Accounting regulatory procedures  
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During the period covered in this paper (1988-1997), the following situation 
existed with regards to financial reporting regulation (Buijink and Eken 1999, and 
Zeff et al. 1999) in the Netherlands. 
The Fourth (1978) and Seventh (1983) EU Directives on Company Law are 
incorporated in the Netherlands in domestic company law. In the Fourth Directive, the 
format and content of reporting by companies with limited liability is regulated (in 
particular, the overriding principle ‘true and fair view’ is adopted), and in the seventh 
Directive, regulation about the consolidated financial statements is stipulated.  
The Dutch annual reporting is regulated in company law as part of the Dutch 
Civil Code. Parliament is the primary source of financial reporting regulation, which 
is initiated by the Minister of Justice (Minister van Justitie) and evaluated by the 
Social  and  Economic  Council  (Sociaal-Economische  Raad,  or  SER),  the  advisory 
body of parliament in economic matters, and by the Council of State (Raad van State), 
the government’s senior advisory body on legal matters.  
The  Enterprise  Chamber  (Ondernemingskamer)  has  the  legal  authority  to 
evaluate the complaints from interested parties if they consider corporate financial 
statements not to comply with the law.  
The  Dutch  auditing  profession  and  the  representatives  from  companies 
participate in the council for annual reporting (Raad voor de Jaarverslaggeving, or 
RJ). As a private sector regulatory body, the RJ issues guidelines that elaborate on the 
legal  stipulations.  The  Netherlands  Institute  of  Registered  Accountants  (NIvRA) 
provides technical support to the RJ. But, note that the guidelines do not have the 
legal position of law; and the auditors do not need to report non-compliance. The RJ 
is less influential than for example the FASB in the US (Van Lent 1997).  
                                                                                                                                                                      
2 Data from 1962-1997  
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3.2. Dirty surplus accounting possibilities in the Netherlands 
Dutch accounting law is not explicit in its choice of adopting an all-inclusive 
concept of income. But, the Guidelines (Richtlijnen) of the RJ did require an all-
inclusive income statement (RJ 240.202) in the period considered, with some specific 
exceptions  however.  The  dirty  surplus  items  included  the  following  in  the  period 
1988-1997 (the period that the paper looks at): 
a)  Purchased goodwill can be charged directly to equity (Dutch accounting law, Section 
2:389.7);
3 
b)  The creation of a revaluation reserve for the amount of the value increase of an asset, in 
case  of  application  of  current  valuation  (Dutch  accounting  law,  Section  2:390.1). 
Decreases in the value of assets valued at current prices should as a rule be booked to 
reduce the revaluation reserve. Only if there is no more revaluation reserve left, should a 
decrease in current value be charged as a loss to the income statement (Dutch accounting 
law, Section 2:390.3); 
c)  Currency translation differences can be booked directly to equity. The Dutch law 
merely requires that the policies for the translation of amounts in foreign currency 
are  disclosed,  and  that  the  policy  for  the  recognition  of  currency  translation 
differences is disclosed (Dutch accounting law, Section 2:384.5). The RJ requires 
currency translation differences with respect to activities in foreign entities to be 
reflected directly in equity (RJ 120.916-922); 
d)  The  cumulative  effect  of  changes  in  accounting  policies  (RJ  140.113-117)  and  the 
correction of fundamental errors (RJ 150.106) are preferably reflected directly in equity; 
e)  Expenses and capital tax in respect of an issue of shares are allowed to be charged to the 
share  premium,  although  it  is  preferred  to  capitalize  and  amortize  these  items  or  to 
charge them directly to income (RJ 240.213);  
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f)   The following items of a non-recurring or exceptional nature, if material, may be shown 
directly as movements in equity (RJ 240.211): 
-  ‘Adjustments’ to the provision for deferred tax liabilities due to changes in the tax 
rate, but only to the extent that the deferred liability relates to revaluation of assets; 
-  Effects of a financial reorganization whereby creditors and shareholders relinquish 
all or part of their rights in connection with the write-off of a loss; 
-  Losses  due  to  the  destruction  of  capital  (for  example  as  the  result  of  a  natural 
disaster) for which it is not possible or not customary to take out insurance cover; 
adverse  effects  of  nationalizations,  one-off  capital  levies  or  similar  forms  of 
expropriation.”  
All in all, quite a few exceptions to all-inclusive income were allowed by the RJ in 
the  Netherlands  in  the period  1988-1997.  There  was  no  requirement  to  include  a 
comprehensive income statement with the primary financial statements. There was, 
however, a legal requirement to provide a statement of movements in equity in the 
notes to the financial statements (Section 2:378.1). For each item in equity, i.e. issued 
capital and the various separate reserves (Section 2:373.1), this statement should show 
the opening balance, additions and reductions during the financial year (classified 
according to their nature) and the closing balance.   
In sum, five categories of dirty surplus accounting flows that existed in the period 
covered in this paper will be considered: goodwill write-offs (GW), asset revaluations 
(REV),  currency  translation  differences  (CUR),  extraordinary  dirty  surplus  items 
(EDSI) which are the effects of the ‘events’ described under f. above, and sundry 
items (OTH) including the ‘events’ described under d. and e. above.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 The Council for Annual Reporting abolished dirty surplus treatment of goodwill in 2000 (RJ 
500.218), and the Dutch government has proposed to Parliament a bill to the same effect in 2002 
(Kamerstukken Eerste en Tweede Kamer, publication number 28220).  
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4. Research question development and research design 
4.1. Incremental value relevance of dirty surplus flows   
The value relevance of accounting flows is conventionally defined as their 
statistically significant relation with stock returns. We regress the dirty surplus items 
on returns after controlling for the effects of net income. The purpose of the tests is to 
discover the variations in return that can be explained by dirty surplus items (i.e. 
incremental to net income), ceteris paribus. This test is proposed to examine whether 
or not value relevant accounting flows are excluded from net income. 
Our first research question is:  
Are dirty surplus flows incrementally value relevant over net income?   
We extend our testing window to up to 10 years. Due to timing differences on 
the recognition of economic events in stock returns and in the accounting system, the 
returns-earnings associations are stronger over longer windows (Easton et al. 1992). 
Warfield and Wild (1992) also show that the long interval approach is capable of 
reducing the earnings’ measurement errors. We take the long interval methodology 
initiated by Easton et al. (1992), and further developed by Warfield and Wild (1992), 
and used by O' Hanlon and Pope (1999) in the context of dirty surplus accounting 
flows to be able to perform a more powerful test.   
Investors are assumed to pursue a ‘hold and invest’ strategy, which means that 
the dividends are assumed to be reinvested to earn the equity cost of capital in the 
subsequent period. The cum-dividends stock returns at time t is accumulated over a T-
period interval. The return (
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Our period t return lags the corresponding accounting period by six months to 
allow for a full assimilation of accounting information.  
All accounting flows are accumulated accordingly and are all scaled by the 
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Where 
T NI : net income (i.e. income after extraordinary items), 
T DS : total 
dirty  surplus  flows, 
T CUR :  foreign  currency  translation  differences, 
T EDSI : 
extraordinary  dirty  surplus  items, 
T GW :  goodwill  write-offs, 
T REV :  asset 
revaluations, 
T OTH : sundries, and 
T NICL : clean surplus net income (i.e. the sum of 
the dirty surplus flows and the net income).  
Accounting flows were accumulated after multiplying the accounting flows of 
period t in the T-period interval by  t a , which is ‘the ratio of a full retention opening 
(time t-1) book value of shareholders’ funds computed by assuming reinvestment of 
dividends (net of equity issues) arising earlier in the T-period interval, and the actual 
opening (time t-1) book value of shareholders’ funds’
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4 Note that we substitute t for their subscribe s to denote periods.  
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In equation E3,  0 BV  is the opening book value of shareholders’ funds at the 
start of the T-period interval and  1 - t BV  is the book value at the start of period t. We 
use accumulation intervals of up to 10 years. We report results based on accumulation 
intervals of 1, 2, 5, and 10 years.  
The first model (M1) is a cross-sectional univariate regression of stock return 





it e NI r 1 1 1 + + = b a ,   (M1) 
Where T is the interval length, i and t refer to company i and period t respectively. 
The second model (M2) tests the incremental value-relevance of aggregated 







it e DS NI r 2 3 2 2 + + + = b b a                      (M2)  
The  third  model  (M3)  examines  the  incremental  value-relevance  of  five 















it e OTH REV GW EDSI CUR NI r 3 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 + + + + + + + = b b b b b b a (M3) 
We compare model 1, the benchmark model, with model 2 and model 3. If the 
dirty  surplus  flows  are  incrementally  relevant  in  the  presence  of  net  income,  the 
coefficients  on  either  the  total  dirty  surplus  flows  ( 3 b )  or  the  dirty  surplus  flow 
components ( 5 b , 6 b , 7 b , 8 b , 9 b ) should be significantly different from zero, which is 
evaluated with a t-statistic in M2 or the F-statistic in M3 for the joint significance of 
dirty surplus flows components.  
 
4.2. Relative value relevance of clean surplus net income 
We also examine the usefulness of including dirty surplus items to earnings 
and compare the superiority of two earnings measures: clean surplus earnings and  
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reported earnings. Dirty surplus flows would be relevant to improve earnings quality, 
if clean surplus net income has higher coefficients than that of reported earnings since 
higher coefficients imply a more persistent earnings measure. The methodology is 
motivated by the studies of Dhaliwal et al. (1999). This test could assist the users of 
earnings information to choose from alternative earnings’ measures. 
Our second research question is:  
Is  clean  surplus  net  income  more  highly  associated  with  returns  than  net 
income?  






it e NICL r 4 10 4 + + = b a                         (M4) 
Where 
T
it NICL  is defined as net income plus dirty surplus flows of a T-period 
interval  of  company  i  at  period  t.  We  again  here  use  the  long  interval  approach 
explained earlier. This model will empirically investigate the effects of including dirty 
surplus flows on the quality of earnings. M4 will be compared with M1 and the J-test 
for non-nested models is used as the criterion for model selection (i.e. which earnings 
measure is more relevant in explaining returns).  
 
5. Data selection and empirical results 
5.1. Data selection and descriptive statistics 
We gather market data from Datastream for the whole population of Dutch listed 
firms  during  1988-1997  and  we  hand-collect  accounting  information  from  firms’ 
financial statements for the same period. The sample is reduced to 118 firms after 
excluding financial firms and firms listed also in other exchanges. The final sample is 
further refined with the following criteria:  
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i.  Annual price, dividends, and market value information are available on the 2001 
Datastream research files;  
ii.  The required accounting information is available in annual financial reports and 
the fiscal-year ends in December; 
iii.  Complete information concerning the companies is available across the whole 
research period (1988-1997).  
This selection procedure yields 85 Dutch firms. We list their names in appendix 
1.  For  each  of  them,  we  have  10  observations  (i.e.  850  firm-year  observations). 
Employing these selection criteria may lead to survivor bias. However, it enables us 
to  control  for  the  effects  of  extreme  values  associated  with  financially  distressed 
firms.  
Table 1 shows the sample distribution by industries.  
Insert table 1 here 
Table  2  presents  descriptive  statistics  of  the  variables.  The  variables  are 
winsorized at 0.005 at each tail over 1-year interval, at 0.025 at each tail over 2-year, 
5-year,  and  10-year  intervals  in  order  to  deal  with  the  influential  observations 
problem.  
On average, extraordinary dirty surplus flows (EDSI) and sundries (OTH) are 
not significantly different from zero over the 1-year interval. Table 2 reveals that 
(scaled) goodwill write-offs are by far the most important dirty surplus item over all 
intervals. For instance over the 1-year interval goodwill write-offs make up almost all 
of dirty surplus flows on average. Other dirty surplus flows are relatively unimportant 
over all intervals. Note also that clean surplus net income is about 50% (mean) of the 
reported income over all intervals. It suggests that the dirty surplus flows reduce net 
income substantially.   
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Insert table 2 here 
Table  3  provides  the  correlation  matrix  over  1-year  interval.  There  is  a 
significant  positive  correlation  between  dirty  surplus  flows  and  returns.  The 
correlations among dirty surplus flows are always lower than 10%, and those dirty 
surplus flows are not highly associated with reported net income (less than 10%) 
either. However, the two scaled income measures: reported net income and the pro 
forma clean surplus income, are highly correlated (86.2%).  
Insert table 3 here 
Overall, the descriptive statistics suggest that the magnitude of scaled dirty 
surplus accounting flows is larger in the Netherlands than in the UK: the median is –
0.006 in the Netherlands, and -0.004 in the UK
5 (see O’Hanlon and Pope 1999).  
 
5.2.Regression results 
In  table  4,  we  present  the  results  for  the  estimated  models  over  various 
intervals.  Panel  A-D  show  the  estimation  results  for  model  1-4  respectively.  For 
example, panel A shows regression statistics for the returns - (reported) income model 
(M1) of up to 10 years, and panel B presents the results for the returns - (reported) 
income-total dirty surplus flows model (M2) of up to 10 years, and so on.   
Insert table 4 here 
The coefficients on reported net income (Panel A) are always positively and 
significantly different from zero at 1% significance level. The results thus provide 
consistent  evidence  that  Dutch  reported  earnings  are  value-relevant.  For  1-year 
interval, the coefficient of total dirty surplus flows (Panel B) is significant at 1% level. 
Furthermore, in panel C it can be seen that for the 1-year interval currency translation 
differences and goodwill write-offs are significant in explaining returns and the F-test  
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(6.87)  of  the  joint  significance  on  those  components  strongly  rejects  the  null 
hypothesis that none of them are value relevant in the presence of net income. Also, 
both the coefficient and the R-square are higher in the return-clean surplus income 
regression (0.522 and 0.036 respectively) than in the return-net income regression 
(0.463  and  0.020  respectively)  (Panel  A  and  Panel  D).  The  J-test  of  non-nested 
models prefers the clean surplus earnings as the explanatory variable to return because 
the test statistics reject the null hypothesis that model 1 is preferred over model 4, and 
the  test  statistics  cannot  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  model  4  performs  better. 
Hence, dirty surplus accounting flows  are  value relevant and  useful in improving 
contemporary earnings quality. Overall, these findings imply that Dutch managers did 
indeed exclude value relevant accounting flows from bottom line earnings for 1-year 
intervals in the period considered.  
Over  longer  intervals,  the  coefficients  of  total  dirty  surplus  flows  are 
insignificantly  different  from  zero.  However,  currency  translation  differences  are 
negatively associated with return over 5 and 10-year intervals, and goodwill write-offs 
are significantly different from zero over 2 and 10 year intervals. It thus appears that 
investors over-react to these two items in the short run and the market corrects for this 
over-reaction in the long run. Over longer accumulation intervals, the J-test always 
prefers the reported income as the explanatory variable for return, either marginally at 
10% level over a  2-year window or at 1% level over  5,  and 10-year intervals. It 
implies that the reported earnings contain more permanent elements than the clean 
surplus earnings, and the reported earnings are the preferred measure of economic 
income in the long run.    
                                                                                                                                                                      
5 The descriptive statistics are reported in the UK for the period 1973-1992.  
 
   
  17 
Consistent with previous studies, overall, we observe an increase of returns-
earnings  association  as  the  accumulation  intervals  are  lengthened:  the  R-squares 
increase from 2% to 11% in model 1, from 4% to 17% in model 2, from 6% to 26% in 
model 3, and from 4% to 5% in model 4. Except that there is a slight decrease over 
the 10-year window in model 1 and in model 4. The decrease may be the result of 
potential outliers as the number of observations decreases substantially in that period. 
As expected, after we winsorize the observations at 5% of each tail, we observe an 
increase of R-square for these two models over the 10-year window. In sum, our 
findings  are  comparable  with  previous  findings  that  accumulating  accounting 
information could increase its explanatory power and reduce its measurement errors.  
 
6. Conclusion and suggestions for future research 
This paper tests the relevance of dirty surplus flows to equity investors with 
both an incremental and a relative association study. We find dirty surplus items; in 
particular currency translation differences and goodwill write-offs are value relevant 
over 1-year windows. We also find that clean surplus income is more relevant than 
reported income for 1-year windows. Over longer period intervals dirty surplus items 
are  no  longer  consistently  value  relevant.  Over  10-year  intervals  accumulated 
currency  translation  differences  and  goodwill  write-offs  affect  returns  negatively. 
Over longer periods, consistent with the previous findings, reported income is more 
relevant than clean surplus income in the period considered in the Netherlands. There 
is also an increase of the value relevance of accounting information as we extend the 
accumulation intervals.  
Therefore,  there  is  evidence  that  Dutch  managers  write  off  value  relevant 
information to increase reported earnings over 1-year intervals. Given the significant  
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association of important dirty surplus flows to returns, it appears advisable to include 
the  dirty  surplus  flows  in  the  income  statement  for  full  disclosure,  as  was 
subsequently done (see session 1).  
Note that the empirical tests of the value relevance of dirty surplus flows used 
in this paper have an equity valuation perspective. It has to be interpreted with caution 
when drawing standard setting inferences. Other empirical studies could investigate 
the influence of accounting information on contracting costs for instance.  
Also,  it  should  be  noted  that  by  providing  more  reliable  information  the 
political and auditors’ liability costs (Kothari et al. 1998) could be reduced even if the 
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Appendix 1 
The firms in the final sample 
Number Name of the firms 
1  Aalberts Industries 
2  ACF Holding N.V. (97: Brocacef) 
3  Ahold 
4  Ahrend Groep 
5  AIR (Automobiel Industrie Rotterdam) 
6  Akzo 
7  Alanheri 
8  Amsterdam Rubber Cultuur Maatschappij (RCMA) 
9  ASD Amst. Options Traders (AOT) 
10  Arag Holding 
11  BAM Holding 
12  Batenburg Beheer 
13  Beer’s Zonen 
14  Blydestein – Willink 
15  Boer, de,  Winkelbedrijf (97: De Boer Unigro) 
16  Boer, de, Drukkerij (Boekhoven) (93: Roto Smeets de Boer) 
17  Boskalis Westminster 
18  Burgman Heybroek 
19  Cate, ten, Nijverdal 
20  Cindu-Key & Kramer (CKK) / Cindu Int. 
21  CVG (Crown v. Gelder c ) 
22  Dico International 
23  Dorp Groep 
24  Drie Electronics 
25  Econosto 
26  Elsevier 
27  Eriks Holding 
28  Frans Maas Beheer 
29  Gamma Holding 
30  Gelderse Papier Groep 
31  Getronics 
32  Geveke Electr. Int. / Geveke 
33  Gouda Vuurvast 
34  Grolsch Bierbr. 
35  Groothandelsgebouwen 
36  GTI-Holding 
37  Hagemeyer 
38  HBG (Hollandse Beton Groep) 
39  Heineken 
40  Hoek Loos (' s Machine & Zuurstoffabriek) 
41  Hoogovens 
42  Hunter Douglas 
43  Internatio Muller 
44  Klene' s  
45  Koppelpoort Holding 
46  Krasnapolsky  
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47  Kuhne + Heitz 
48  Landre & Gilderman 
49  Macintosh Confectie 
50  Management Share 
51  Melle, van 
52  Mulder Boskoop 
53  Naeff 
54  NAGRON (Nat. Grondbezit) 
55  NBM Bouw / NBM Amstelland 
56  NEDAP 
57  Nedlloyd 
58  Nedschroef Holding 
59  Neways Electroniscs 
60  NKF Holding 
61  Norit 
62  Nutricia Gem. Bezit / Ver. Bedr. 
63  Oce van der Grinten 
64  Ordina Beheer 
65  OTRA 
66  Pakhoed 
67  Philips 
68  Polynorm 
69  Porceleyne Fles 
70  Reesink 
71  Rood Testhouse 
72  Stork 
73  Schuitema 
74  Schuttersveld 
75  Simac Techniek 
76  Telegraaf de, Holding 
77  Textielgroep Twenthe 
78  Tulip Computers 
79  Twent. Kabel Holding 
80  Ubbink 
81  VNU verz. Bez. 
82  Vredestein 
83  Wolters Kluwer 
84  Wegener Arcade ( Wegener Tijl) 
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  Table 1    
Sample distribution by industrial sector
6 
Industrial Sector  Number of Companies 
Brewers  2 
Chemicals, commodity  4 
Other construction  4 
Distrib. ind. Comps  9 
Diversified industry  5 
Electronic equipment  12 
Engineering, general  8 
Food + drug retailers  4 
Food processors  3 
Paper  2 
Household  11 
Information technology  1 
Leisure  1 
Media  6 
Personal products  1 
Real estate development  2 
Retailers, multi dept.  1 
Computer services  4 
Asset management  1 
Steel  1 
Transportation  3 
Med equip + supplies  1 
Total  85 
 
                                                           
6 It is based on the FTSE industrial classification.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive data for variables used to estimate models concerning the association of net 
income and dirty surplus flows with returns 
 
T  N Mean Std.dev. 25% 50% 75%
T=1 year   850
RETU  0.222 0.412 -0.049 0.150 0.416
NI  0.059 0.125 0.047 0.076 0.102
DS  -0.027 0.071 -0.039 -0.006 0
CUR  -0.001 0.010 0 0 0
EDSI  0 0 0 0 0
GW  -0.027 0.056 -0.031 -0.001 0
REV  0.001 0.025 0 0 0
OTH  0 0.009 0 0 0
NICL  0.031 0.150 0.016 0.055 0.093
T=2 year  425
RETU  0.467 0.649 -0.010 0.309 0.790
NI  0.139 0.158 0.112 0.167 0.220
DS  -0.061 0.097 -0.096 -0.032 0
CUR  -0.003 0.015 -0.001 0 0
EDSI  0 0 0 0 0
GW  -0.059 0.086 -0.085 -0.022 0
REV  0.001 0.025 0 0 0
OTH  -0.001 0.009 0 0 0
NICL  0.077 0.213 0.023 0.120 0.193
T=5 year  170
RETU  1.707 2.146 0.351 0.987 2.163
NI  0.446 0.392 0.271 0.465 0.662
DS  -0.167 0.213 -0.288 -0.120 -0.013
CUR  -0.004 0.023 -0.002 0 0
EDSI  0 0 0 0 0
GW  -0.170 0.196 -0.271 -0.101 00
REV  0.007 0.059 0 0 0.004
OTH  -0.003 0.021 0 0 0
NICL  0.292 0.444 0.070 0.294 0.531
T=10 year  85
RETU  5.119 4.891 1.801 4.059 7.254
NI  1.210 1.009 0.562 1.192 1.740
DS  -0.428 0.475 -0.721 -0.319 -0.083
CUR  -0.004 0.033 -0.006 0 0.002
EDSI  -0.001 0.007 0 0 0
GW  -0.432 0.471 -0.759 -0.278 -0.053
REV  0.022 0.107 -0.003 0 0.013
OTH  -0.002 0.039 -0.007 0 0.004
NICL  0.798 0.997 0.160 0.602 1.333
The sample consists of all 1988-1997 listed non-financial Dutch firms that have required financial data 
from  Datastream  and  accounting  data  in  their  financial  reports.  The  firms  also  have  complete 
information  available  across  the  period  1988-1997  and  their  fiscal  years  end  in  December. 
Observations are winsorized at 0.005 at each tail over 1-year interval, at 0.025 at each tail over 2-year, 
5-year, and 10-year intervals. Variable definition: T: accumulation interval of T years. N: the number 
of firm-year observations. Int.: intercepts of the respective model. NI: reported net income. DS: total 
dirty surplus flows. CUR: currency translation differences. EDSI: extraordinary dirty surplus items. 
GW: goodwill write-offs. REV: asset revaluations. OTH: sundries. NICL: clean surplus net income. All 
accounting flows are scaled by the market value of the firm 6-month after the beginning of the interval 
and accumulated as described in session 4.1.  
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Table 3 
Correlation matrix for variables used to estimate models of the association of net income and 
dirty surplus flows with return over 1-year interval 
 
  RETU  NI  DS  CUR  EDSI  GW  REV  OTH  NICL 
RETU  1.000                 
NI  0.140  1.000             
  (0.000)                 
DS  0.157  0.090 1.000           
  (0.000)  (0.008)             
CUR  0.140  0.054 0.160 1.000         
  (0.000)  (0.118) (0.000)           
EDSI  0.052  -0.118 -0.047 0.052 1.000         
  (0.130)  (0.001) (0.173) (0.129)         
GW  0.105  -0.006 0.838 -0.038 -0.046  1.000     
  (0.002)  (0.861) (0.000) (0.272) (0.183)         
REV  0.044  0.070 0.359 -0.012 -0.061  0.033 1.000   
  (0.196)  (0.042) (0.000) (0.726) (0.075)  (0.330)     
OTH  0.057  0.061 0.321 0.011 -0.026  0.081 0.082 1.000   
  (0.099)  (0.077) (0.000) (0.752) (0.455)  (0.018) (0.017)   
NICL  0.190  0.862 0.559 0.117 -0.102  0.408 0.218 0.207   
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  1.000
The sample consists of all 1988-1997 listed non-financial Dutch firms that have required financial data 
from  Datastream  and  accounting  data  in  their  financial  reports.  The  firms  also  have  complete 
information  available  across  the  period  1988-1997  and  their  fiscal  years  end  in  December. 
Observations are winsorized at 0.005 at each tail over 1-year interval, at 0.025 at each tail over 2-year, 
5-year, and 10-year intervals. Variable definition: T: accumulation interval of T years. N: the number 
of firm-year observations. Int.: intercepts of the respective model. NI: reported net income. DS: total 
dirty surplus flows. CUR: currency translation differences. EDSI: extraordinary dirty surplus items. 
GW: goodwill write-offs. REV: asset revaluations. OTH: sundries. NICL: clean surplus net income. 
The significance level of each correlation coefficient is reported in parentheses below the reported 
correlation coefficients. All accounting flows are scaled by the market value of the firm 6-month after 
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Table 4 
Results of the estimation of models that test the incremental (relative) value relevance of dirty 
surplus flows (clean surplus income) to reported net income in explaining return over various 
accumulation intervals 
 
Panel A: model 1  
T  N  Int.  NI  R-Sq.             
1  850 0.195  0.463  0.020             
      (0.015)***  (0.093)***                     
2  425 0.341  0.909  0.049             
    (0.037)***  (0.155)***               
5  170 0.852  1.922  0.124             
    (0.280)***  (0.533)***               
10 85  3.134  1.640  0.115             
    (0.708)***  (0.412)***               
Panel B: model 2 
T  N  Int.  NI  DS  R-Sq.           
1  850 0.221  0.419  0.846  0.041           
      (0.017)***  (0.088)***  (0.167)***                  
2  425 0.367  0.886  0.384  0.053           
    (0.045)***  (0.159)***  (0.309)             
5  170 0.746  1.834  -0.868  0.131           
    (0.321)**  (0.539)***  (0.983)             
10 85  2.518  1.272  -2.481  0.167           
    (0.792)***  (0.458)***  (1.593)             
Panel C: model 3 
T  N  Int.  NI  CUR  EDSI  GW  REV  OTH  R-Sq. F-test 
1  850 0.222  0.453  5.517  155.628  0.808  0.555  1.714  0.056 6.87*** 
      (0.017)***  (0.096)***  (1.431)***  (128.000) (0.197)***  (0.583)  (1.728)      
2  425 0.499  0.277  0.476  5.620  0.681  0.428  1.430  0.041 0.703 
    (0.052)***  (0.088)***  (1.055)  (4.327)  (0.402)*  (0.654)  (0.908)     
5  170 1.570  1.814  -5.863  -4.549  2.586  0.738  0.506  0.066 1.796 
    (0.627)***  (0.889)***  (2.819)***  (15.084)  (4.068)  (5.169)  (2.242)     
10 85  1.699  1.460  -34.127  2.998  -3.485  0.688  4.920  0.262 2.330** 
    (0.790)**  (0.423)***  (12.350)***  (40.249)  (1.292)***  (3.143)  (9.922)     
Panel D: model 4 
T  N  Int.  NICL  R-sq.  Nn. (M1)  Nn. (M4)         
1  850 0.205  0.522  0.036  4.037***  -1.367         
      (0.014)***  (0.069)***                     
2  425 0.418  0.638  0.044  0.868  1.764*         
    (0.031)***  (0.126)***               
5  170 1.307  1.367  0.080  0.304  2.900***         
    (0.216)***  (0.489)***               
10 85  4.286  1.044  0.050  -1.317  2.877***         
    (0.778)***  (0.524)**               
The sample consists of all 1988-1997 listed non-financial Dutch firms that have required financial data 
from  Datastream  and  accounting  data  in  their  financial  reports.  The  firms  also  have  complete 
information  available  across  the  period  1988-1997  and  their  fiscal  years  end  in  December.  
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Observations are winsorized at 0.005 at each tail over 1-year interval, at 0.025 at each tail over 2-year, 
5-year, and 10-year intervals.  




it r 1 1 1 + + = b a  






it r 2 3 2 2 + + + = b b a  














it r 3 9 8 7 6 5 4 31 + + + + + + + = b b b b b b a  




it r 4 10 4 + + = b a  
Variable definition: T: accumulation interval of T years. N: the number of firm-year observations. Int.: 
intercepts  of  the  respective  model.  NI:  reported  net  income.  DS:  total  dirty  surplus  flows.  CUR: 
currency translation differences. EDSI: extraordinary dirty surplus items. GW: goodwill write-offs. 
REV: asset revaluations. OTH: sundries. NICL: clean surplus net income. All accounting flows are 
scaled by the market value of the firm 6-month after the beginning of the interval and accumulated as 
described in session 4.1. 
The panels labeled M1, M2, M3, and M4 report the estimated coefficients on the respective models. 
The sub-columns label the variables’ names report the estimated coefficients on the relevant variables. 
R-Sq.: R-squares of the estimated models. F-test: F-statistics of the joint significance of CUR, EDSI, 
GW, REV, and OTH. Nn. (M1) tests the null hypothesis that M1 is redundant over M4, and Nn. (M4) 
tests the null hypothesis that M4 is redundant over M1 with the non-nested J-tests.  
*** the test statistics are significant at 1 percent level. 
** the test statistics are significant at 5 percent level. 
* the test statistics are significant at 10 percent level. 
Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses below the reported coefficients.  
       
 